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Introduction
Visits to the doctor are, for most Americans, a chore. We go to
the doctor not because we want to but because doctors have
something that we lack: medical expertise.
When we go to the doctor, we are asking her to transfer a limited
amount of knowledge about the human body and all of its potential
weaknesses to us. The doctor pokes us, shines light on us to see parts
of us that go unseen for several months, directs us to cough or spit or
urinate or squat, and asks us questions that we may not want to
answer. Then, in between periods of waiting that vary between
annoying and absurd, the doctor tells us what is wrong with us and
what we can do (or not do) about it.
To say that speech is important to this equation would be like
saying speech is important to winning a debate; speech is the very
mechanism by which the physician-patient relationship functions. A
typical doctor visit is bookended by dialogue between physician and
patient. At first, the physician asks, and the patient answers,
questions in an attempt to diagnose the patient. At the conclusion,
the physician returns to give the patient the diagnosis and the
recommended treatment plan.
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The First Amendment protects “freedom of speech”—the right of
each person to be free from government restrictions on many different
kinds of speech.1 While the First Amendment does not protect all
speech, it does cover a vast range of expression. The First
Amendment gives a person the freedom to wear a jacket with “Fuck
the Draft” printed on the back into a courthouse,2 a corporation the
right to give money to support a political candidate or cause,3 video
game store owners the right to sell violent games to minors,4 and, as
demonstrated below, a doctor the right to recommend that patients
use marijuana to treat the symptoms of an illness.5
At the same time, however, states have the authority to regulate
certain professions, including the medical profession. To be able to
practice medicine in a state, a doctor must obtain a license to
practice.6 The license is issued by a state board and carries with it
certain obligations and responsibilities—most of which are concerned
with protecting the vulnerabilities that are an inherent part of being a
patient.7
Patients are inherently vulnerable in their relationships with
physicians because physicians have the expertise—the medical knowledge—that each patient needs. This creates an “imbalance of power”
between the physician and patient.8 This imbalance can be so great
that a patient may come to depend on the physician’s expertise “on
matters of life and death.”9 Indeed, so vulnerable are patients in some

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).

3.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).

4.

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).

5.

Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).

6.

E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (noting that the practice of medicine is subject to
“reasonable licensing and regulation by the state”); Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fla. 760 F.3d 1195, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).

7.

E.g., Katharin McCarthy, Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of
Free Speech Rights in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 56 Me. L. Rev.
447, 465 (2004) (“[T]he states retain the power to regulate the
professional conduct of physicians, even when speech may be used to
carry the conduct out . . . .”).

8.

Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual (Lois Snyder ed., 6th ed.
2012), available at http://www.acponline.org/running_practice/ethics/
manual/manual6th.htm#physician-patient [hereinafter ACP Ethics
Manual]; Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d, at 1214.

9.

Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d, at 1214.
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situations that a patient “may be . . . at the mercy of his or her
physician.”10
Risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities is perhaps at its
highest when the physician is communicating with the patient,
because that is precisely how and when the transfer of expertise from
physician to patient occurs. When a physician tells a patient that the
patient needs to undergo, for example, chemotherapy as treatment for
malignant cancer, the patient’s life is altered in an instant. This
imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that most patients take doctors
at their word; one can easily imagine that a patient diagnosed with
malignant cancer and prescribed chemotherapy might try to schedule
treatment as soon as possible, immediately putting trust in the
physician’s diagnosis and treatment recommendation.
Perhaps the most obvious way to correct the physician-patient
imbalance is to regulate physicians in a way that protects patients’
interests.11 As discussed above, states have this power as the licensing
bodies for the medical profession.
One common manifestation of state protection against physician
conduct is the malpractice suit. Using the cancer patient example
above, if the physician were to make a mistake when diagnosing the
patient with cancer (and then recommending chemotherapy), the
patient would, generally speaking, be able to sue the doctor for
malpractice in an attempt to be made whole again. The physician
who committed the malpractice could not defend her actions in court
by saying her diagnosis and treatment were protected by the First
Amendment simply because the diagnosis was made and the
treatment prescribed through the medium of speech.12
All of this is, more or less, commonly understood. What is not
commonly understood, however, is the nature of the relationship
between the First Amendment and state regulations of the practice of
medicine, including regulations stipulating what doctors can, must,
and must not say to their patients. Indeed, the intersection of the
First Amendment and physician-patient speech has become so utterly

10.

Id.

11.

See, e.g., id. at 1215 (“[W]ithout the protections imposed by
professional codes of conduct and the law of malpractice, such a patient
would have no recourse if the physician chooses to abuse the physicianpatient relationship in some way . . . .”).

12.

Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 950
(“Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are
routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking . . . .”).
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confounding that lower federal courts seem to be issuing conflicting
opinions each time a physician-patient speech case arises.13
Only in passing has the Supreme Court addressed the conflict
between the First Amendment and state regulation of physician
speech.14 This has left lower courts to decide entire cases on the basis
of single and isolated statements.15 Because speech is so critical to the
proper functioning of the physician-patient relationship—and because
courts cannot agree on a proper legal standard for evaluating First
Amendment claims in the context of state regulations of physician
speech—it is my position that the Supreme Court should intervene
and set a clear standard for lower courts. This standard must take
account of states’ interests in regulating the medical profession: to
protect patients’ interests in receiving the best possible medical care.
If a constitutional standard for physician-patient speech fails to
take adequate account of patients’ rights to receive information under
the First Amendment, that standard is insufficient. Moreover, by
focusing on physician-patient speech from the standpoint of physicians’ rights to deliver information to patients,16 lower federal courts
are failing to protect the constitutional rights of patients as a class. It
is the rights of patients to receive information from physicians, much
more than the rights of physicians to deliver information to patients,
that regulation of physician-patient speech threatens.17 Thus, it is critical for courts to analyze any regulation of physician-patient speech
from the perspective of patients.
13.

See infra Parts II, III (examining the holdings of five recent physicianpatient speech cases and analyzing those cases for conflicts and
similarities).

14.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992) (plurality opinion) (dismissing the argument for constitutional
protection of physician-patient speech in a paragraph).

15.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d
889, 900 (8th Cir. 2012) (turning on the application of the truthful-andnot-misleading test articulated in Casey); Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,
880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (attempting to apply the
Casey test), rev’d sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,
760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014); Post, supra note 12, at 944 (“Although
the Court has decided a number of cases about professional advertising,
‘the Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First
Amendment contours of a professional’s freedom to speak to a client.’”
(quoting Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech,
and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev.
771, 834 (1999))).

16.

See infra Part III.

17.

See Post, supra note 12, at 979 (“First Amendment constraints on the
regulation of professional physician speech . . . should focus on the right
of the patient to receive information, rather than on the right of the
doctor to speak as she wishes.”).
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In Part I, this Note uses the guidance of scholars to define the
contours of the physician-patient speech doctrine. Specifically, Part I
attempts to divide physician-patient speech into two categories:
physician speech that is equivalent to “conduct” and physician speech
that is mere speech. As will be discussed in Part II, the lower courts
purport to use these two categories to distinguish between physician
speech that is subject to state regulation and physician speech that
receives substantial First Amendment protection.
Part II is divided into three sections, each of which explores
recent decisions by lower courts and their significance on the greater
physician-speech doctrine. Part II.A explains and analyzes two cases
from the Ninth Circuit. In Conant v. Walters,18 the Ninth Circuit
struck down a federal policy that threatened to punish any physician
who would recommend that a patient use marijuana.19 Interestingly,
the Ninth Circuit was forced to distinguish Conant in the next case I
will discuss, Pickup v. Brown,20 which upheld a California law that
prohibits licensed mental health care providers from using certain
practices to attempt to persuade juveniles to change their sexual
orientation.21 Part II.B explains and analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s
majority opinion in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,22 which
reversed the trial court in the course of upholding a Florida law that
prohibits physicians from asking patients if they own guns.23 Lastly,
Part II.C examines the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Planned
Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds,24
which upheld state-mandated physician speech regarding the
likelihood of a patient who has had an abortion to commit suicide or
experience suicide ideation.25
Part III ties together the cases discussed in Part II by pointing
out the similarities and inconsistencies between them in order to
establish something along the lines of a loose-fitting “physicianpatient speech doctrine.” At the heart of this “doctrine” is a pattern
of examining the First Amendment rights at stake from the
standpoint of the physician as the deliverer of medical advice, as
opposed to the patient as receiver of medical advice.

18.

309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).

19.

Id. at 632.

20.

740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).

21.

Id. at 1222.

22.

760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).

23.

Id. at 1203.

24.

686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).

25.

Id. at 900.

799

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Physician-Patient Speech

Part IV argues that the current doctrine fails to adequately take
account of patients’ stakes in the outcomes of the cases, as well as in
the policy created by a First Amendment jurisprudence that looks at
physician speech cases through the narrow lens of the physician as
deliverer of medical information. While physicians are subject to state
regulation, the patient is not. Because patients are not subject to
state regulation, any law that cuts into a patient’s First Amendment
rights should receive more than rational-basis scrutiny. Furthermore,
because the Supreme Court has, time and time again, affirmed the
First Amendment rights of a person to receive speech,26 that right
should enter into any analysis of a regulation that abridges that right.
I ultimately conclude that in order to create a physician-patient
speech doctrine that adequately protects patients’ interests in
receiving frank and open communication from their physicians, courts
must analyze the First Amendment issues from the standpoint of
patients as the recipients of information.

I. Defining the Contours of the
Physician-Patient Speech Doctrine
“The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his
best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as
to need no extended discussion.”
—Justice William O. Douglas27

In order to fully grasp the physician-patient speech doctrine’s
place in the larger context of First Amendment jurisprudence, it is
first necessary to understand why some speech by physicians goes
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. In this section, I explain the
conflict between the First Amendment and state regulations on the
practice of medicine. I will do this by showing (1) why courts might
uphold regulations that clearly abridge physician speech without
giving the First Amendment a second thought and (2) why courts
would not apply the same logic to all regulations that abridge
physician speech.
The physician-patient relationship holds, and has held for a long
time, a very important role in society.28 Patients depend on physicians
26.

See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305
(1965) (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive political
publications via the U.S. Postal Service sent from foreign countries); Bd.
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows
ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send
them . . . .”).

27.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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to ask appropriate questions and properly explain medical procedures
throughout the treatment process.29
Generally speaking, states act as licensing bodies in professional
fields.30 In order to ensure that the general public maintains a level of
trust in each particular professional field, states have latitude to
define minimum acceptable standards of care.31
Because the practice of medicine operates through the medium of
speech, defining minimum acceptable standards of care often involves
rules that compel or restrict speech.32 In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,33 one of the few Supreme Court cases to address
physician-patient speech, the Supreme Court upheld a provision in a
Pennsylvania statute that compelled physicians to give patients
seeking abortions certain information. A plurality of the Justices
concluded that the relevant provision permitted Pennsylvania to
prescribe the content of this message as part of regulating the
standards by which physicians obtain informed consent from their
patients about abortion procedures.34 Planned Parenthood challenged
the informed consent provision as an impermissible speech compulsion
under the First Amendment.35 With little more than a few sentences—and two citations to cases that still seem only marginally
relevant to many First Amendment scholars36—the Court dismissed
Planned Parenthood’s free speech claim. The Court reasoned that
there is “no constitutional infirmity” in compelling speech as part of
the regulation of the practice of medicine.37 Applying the Court’s logic
28.

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (calling the patient-physician
relationship “traditional”).

29.

ACP Ethics Manual, supra note 8, at 78. (“Physicians must strive to
create an environment in which honesty can thrive and patients feel
that concerns and questions are elicited.”).

30.

McCarthy, supra note 7, at 465 (“[T]he states retain the power to
regulate the professional conduct of physicians, even when speech may
be used to carry the conduct out . . . .”).

31.

See id.

32.

Post, supra note 12, at 950.

33.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

34.

Id. at 884 (plurality opinion).

35.

Id.

36.

Id. The Court cites to Wooley v. Maynard for the proposition that the
First Amendment covers the right not to speak. 430 U.S. 705, 705
(1977). But Maynard involved a First Amendment challenge to a New
Hampshire law requiring the state’s motto to be on all license plates,
and had nothing to do with compelled physician speech. Even more
mysterious is the citation to Whalen v. Roe because Whalen did not
involve the First Amendment at all. 429 U.S. 589, 589 (1977).

37.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.

801

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Physician-Patient Speech

to a malpractice claim, for example, it becomes clear that the Court is
correct insofar as it posits that there are at least some situations in
which it would be inappropriate to subject a state regulation on
physician speech to exacting First Amendment scrutiny. As the Ninth
Circuit has put it, “[a] doctor ‘may not counsel a patient to rely on
quack medicine. The First Amendment would not prohibit the
doctor’s loss of license for doing so.’”38
The next step in defining the doctrine is to address why it would
be just as inappropriate, if not more so, to simply say that all
physician speech should go unprotected by the First Amendment. The
relationship between physician and patient is often a nuanced one. A
physician is sometimes a friend of a patient, and at other times the
physician might be a mentor or role model for a patient. Speech
between the physician and the patient therefore cannot be completely
controlled by minimum standards of care and malpractice suits.
Surely a physician can engage a patient in friendly banter about the
weekend’s football game without that speech being subject to
regulation by the state. Another example is that of a statement by a
physician in public and on a matter of public concern. The First
Amendment would not tolerate a state policy that prohibits
physicians from speaking out against a war on a city sidewalk simply
because of the physician’s profession.39
Dean Robert Post described the distinction illustrated above as
the difference between physician-patient speech and speech by a physician.40 “Physician-patient speech” is speech made as part of the
practice of medicine, such as a physician telling a patient that she
should stay off her feet and ice her ankle twice a day. Described in a
38.

Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Conant
v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139, 2000 WL 1281174, at *13 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2000)).

39.

Id. at 1227 (“[A] doctor who publicly advocates a treatment that the
medical establishment considers outside the mainstream, or even dangerous, is entitled to robust protection under the First Amendment—just
as any person is—even though the state has the power to regulate medicine.”); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“[First Amendment] protections are at their apex when a
professional speaks to the public on matters of public concern . . . .”).

40.

Post, supra note 12, at 947. Dean Post uses the terms “professional
speech” and “speech . . . uttered by a professional.” In order to keep the
focus on speech made in the context of the physician-patient relationship and to avoid confusion, this Note uses the term “physician-patient
speech” for speech made during the course of the professional relationship (also called “conduct”) and “speech by a physician” for speech that,
for one reason or another, falls outside that relationship. It bears
emphasis that the physician-patient speech doctrine can really be viewed
as a narrow subset of the professional speech doctrine and that rarely
will there be any important distinctions between physician-patient
speech and professional speech for constitutional purposes.
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more general way, physician-patient speech is conduct because the
speech is inseparable from the act of diagnosing or treating the
patient.41
“Speech by a physician,” on the other hand, describes speech
made by a physician that is not a part of the practice of medicine. If,
for example, “a physician while examining a patient should stumble,
twist his ankle, and spontaneously curse, his exclamations would not
constitute [physician-patient] speech.”42 While this latter example may
offend some patients, it will not directly affect the quality of care that
the patient receives and so is not, or, as we shall see below, should not
be, subject to state regulation.43
Lower courts have attempted to rely upon the distinction between
physician-patient speech and speech by a physician by identifying the
former as “conduct” and the latter as ordinary “speech.”44 Using the
language of conduct versus speech allows courts to avoid the messy
business of attempting to describe the different kinds of speech,
including why each deserves its own distinct category complete with
an entirely different level of First Amendment protection. A lower
court will define speech as conduct if it occurs in a situation the court
sees as an inseparable part of a more general conduct.45 For example,
when a doctor tells a patient to take two pills a day for a week, she is
speaking to the patient, but more generally she is treating the patient.
Lower courts use the opportunity to define the speech within the
general category of treatment because defining it by the more
particular act of speech makes it difficult to distinguish from other
kinds of speech.
41.

Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (noting that where a state regulation on
physician conduct has an “incidental effect on speech,” First Amendment concerns are lessened); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (upholding
Florida law as a legitimate regulation on physician conduct with only an
incidental effect on speech); see also Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1724,
1740 (1995) (“The speech/conduct distinction, a recurring one in First
Amendment jurisprudence, is grounded in the idea that, while the First
Amendment protects freedom of expression, it does not protect mere
action.”).

42.

Post, supra note 12, at 952.

43.

Id. (noting that physician speech is not subject to state regulation if it is
not part of the practice of medicine).

44.

See, e.g., Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29 (using a “continuum” model to
describe the difference between regulations of “conduct,” which receive
little First Amendment protection, and speech about conduct, which
receives some First Amendment protection).

45.

Id. at 1229 (“Most, if not all, medical . . . treatments require speech,
but that fact does not give rise to a First Amendment claim when the
state bans a particular treatment.”).
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Unfortunately, it is not always easy to distinguish between speech
as conduct and ordinary speech. At least one court has taken the
speech as conduct category past the logical limits of the category by
defining all speech that occurs within the confines of the examination
room as conduct.46 Another court has drawn a line between physician
recommendations for how to treat an illness (speech) and the actual
treatment of that illness by prescribing medication (conduct).47
One specific area in which courts have had difficulty distinguishing between physician conduct and physician speech involves
informed consent laws.48 Generally speaking, the doctrine of informed
consent requires physicians to explain to patients their medical
conditions and all appropriate courses of action that are reasonably
within the physician’s knowledge.49 The purpose of informed consent
is to give the patient information in terms that are clear enough to
enable the patient to make autonomous choices about health.50 Some
informed consent laws, like the one discussed in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, compel doctors to give patients a state-mandated message.
The Casey Court upheld the law by reasoning that the state was
simply prescribing the appropriate course of conduct for a physician in
a certain situation. But what happens if an informed consent law
mandates speech that goes outside the field of medicine and into the
field of philosophy? Moreover, what if an informed consent law
compels a physician to tell patients something that is not accepted as

46.

See Wollschlaeger, 760 F. 3d at 1219 (using a “personal nexus” test to
distinguish between permissible state regulations and state regulations
subject to First Amendment scrutiny and concluding that the “personal
nexus” between physician and patient is at its highest “within the confines of the physician’s examination room,” and thus the state is most
free to regulate physicians within the physical space of the examination
room).

47.

See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).

48.

Post, supra note 12, at 972 (asserting that informed consent laws are
distinct from laws that regulate the practice of medicine because
“[r]egulation of informed consent . . . controls the dissemination of
knowledge,” whereas laws that regulate the practice of medicine are
concerned with “the quality of medical care that physicians are
obligated to provide”).

49.

Id. at 941 (“[Informed consent] requires a physician to explain to a
‘patient in nontechnical terms . . . what is at stake: the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks
that may ensue from particular treatment and no treatment.’” (quoting
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972))).

50.

Id. at 972 (“Informed consent doctrine mandates the communication of
medical knowledge to the end that a lay patient can receive the expert
information necessary to make an autonomous, intelligent and accurate
selection of what medical treatment to receive.”).
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true in the greater medical community? In other words, between doctors and state legislatures, who wins?
One last gray area in the doctrine of physician-patient speech is
created when a law restricts speech based on an ideological viewpoint
but purports to be a regulation of the practice of medicine.
Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are generally subject to strict
scrutiny, and are rarely upheld.51 But whether or not a speech
restriction is viewpoint-based is not always an easy question to
answer. Even if statements made by the chief proponents of a law
clearly manifest an intention to be viewpoint-based, courts will not
usually consider the law as such unless it is evident on its face.52
Independent of whether a regulation on physician-patient speech
fits neatly into one of these categories, conduct or speech, speech
compulsion or restriction, content-based or content-neutral, it is the
position of this Note that the most important constitutional interest
at stake in physician-patient speech cases is the First Amendment
right of the patient to receive frank medical advice from the
physician. At least one scholar has made the argument that the
Supreme Court in Casey failed to recognize the First Amendment
rights at issue from the vantage point of the patient.53 This Note
argues that recent cases reveal that the lower federal courts have
strayed even further from protecting patients’ rights. The following
section analyzes some notable physician speech cases that have come
out of the lower courts since Casey. In each of these cases, the courts
fail to take account of the First Amendment rights of patients.

II. The Physician-Patient Doctrine in Action
“[P]rofessional Speech may be entitled to ‘the strongest protection
our Constitution has to offer.’”54

51.

See, e.g., Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative
Restrictions on Patient-Physician Speech About Firearms, 14 DePaul
J. Health Care L. 1, 18 (2011) (“When a regulation goes further than
discriminating in content and discriminates in viewpoint . . . the odds of
withstanding judicial review become even greater, if not insurmountable.”).

52.

See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906
(8th Cir. 2012).

53.

Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.
L. Rev. 201, 206 (1994) (“[T]his Article strives to succeed where Rust
and Casey failed by developing a First Amendment theory of doctorpatient discourse that appreciates and protects patients’ interests.”).

54.

Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fla. Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)).
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“To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the government’s policy
[restricting physician-patient communication] must have the
requisite ‘narrow specificity.’”55
“[T]he Supreme Court ‘has given state and federal legislatures
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical
and scientific uncertainty . . . .’”56

Each of the following cases raises different questions about the
extent to which the physician-patient speech doctrine protects
patients’ First Amendment rights to receive frank medical advice
from their physicians. In Conant v. Walters, a class of physicians and
patients sought to enjoin the enforcement of a statement of policy
that the government intended to punish any physician who
recommended the use of marijuana as an appropriate mode of
treatment.57 In Pickup v. Brown, a group of state-licensed mental
health care providers brought a First Amendment challenge to a
California law that prohibits them from providing “sexual orientation
change efforts” therapy to juveniles.58 In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida, a group of physicians brought a First Amendment challenge
to a Florida law that prohibits physicians from asking patients if the
patients own guns.59 Lastly, in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, Planned Parenthood brought a
First Amendment challenge to an informed consent law in South
Dakota that compels physicians to warn patients of a post-abortion
increase in the risk of suicide and suicide ideation.60
A.

Conant v. Walters and Pickup v. Brown

In 1996, the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
issued a statement addressing California legislation that decriminalized the possession and use of marijuana for certain medical conditions. In the statement, the federal government threatened to revoke
or suspend the license to prescribe controlled substances of any
practicing physician who recommended the use of marijuana as a
legitimate way to treat an illness.61 Seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the government’s policy as a violation of free speech, a group of
55.

Id. at 639 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).

56.

Rounds, 686 F.3d at 899–900 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 163 (2007)).

57.

Conant, 309 F.3d at 633.

58.

Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2014).

59.

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014).

60.

Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892.

61.

Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
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physicians and a group of patients joined together to file a class
action suit.62
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued a permanent injunction against the government
policy as offensive to the First Amendment.63 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit directly addressed the question of whether the federal government’s statement of policy was a permissible regulation of physicianpatient speech.64 Rejecting the government’s argument that under
California law a physician’s recommendation to use marijuana effectively functioned as a prescription, the court concluded that the recommendation was protected speech.65
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a patient was free to make a
number of autonomous legal choices upon receiving a recommendation
to use marijuana. For example, a patient “could petition the government to change the law” banning marijuana use for medical purposes.66 The patient also remained free to choose to violate federal law
by obtaining and using marijuana—or even to reject the physician’s
recommendation altogether. According to the court, the government’s
policy statement did not only restrict speech; it compromised the
physician-patient relationship by “prevent[ing] the physician from
exercising his or her medical judgment.”67
One particular point of emphasis in the majority opinion was “the
core First Amendment values of the doctor-patient relationship.”68
The court took the position that just because physicians are members
of a “regulated profession does not . . . result in a surrender of First
Amendment rights.”69 The court justified this position by pointing to
exactly what it was protecting by extending First Amendment rights
into the realm of the state-regulated physician-patient relationship:
“An integral component of the practice of medicine is the
communication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be
able to speak frankly and openly to patients.”70
Having found physician-patient communications worthy of First
Amendment protection, the court then turned its attention to the
62.

See Conant, 309 F.3d at 633.

63.

Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

64.

Conant, 309 F.3d at 636–39.

65.

Id. at 639.

66.

Id. at 634.

67.

Id. at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 884 (1992)).

68.

Id. at 637.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 636.
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government policy in question. The court held that the policy lacked
the “requisite ‘narrow specificity’” for restrictions on physician
speech;71 the government’s inability “to articulate exactly what speech
is proscribed” ultimately proved fatal to the government’s defense of
its policy.72 Because the government policy depended largely on the
patient designating the physician’s words as a “recommendation,” the
policy could not withstand a First Amendment challenge as it “le[ft]
doctors and patients ‘no security for free discussion.’”73
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence deserves a mention at this point,
and it bears noting that Kozinski’s views here helped form the
theoretical basis upon which this Note is based. Kozinski begins his
concurrence as follows:
I write only to explain that for me the fulcrum of this dispute is
not the First Amendment right of the doctors. That right certainly exists and its impairment justifies the . . . injunction . . .
[But t]hose immediately . . . affected by the federal government’s policy are the patients, who will be denied information
crucial to their well-being . . . .74

Even though Conant’s holding ultimately found First Amendment
value in physician-patient speech, and even though the majority based
its reasoning in part upon the fundamental importance of the
physician-patient relationship, Judge Kozinski felt the need to write
separately to emphasize his belief that the First Amendment rights at
stake belonged to patients, not physicians. The “disparity between
[the] benefits and burdens” that the government policy created for
physicians made it so that physicians had much to lose and little to
gain by either disobeying the policy or challenging it at law.75 They
could recommend marijuana but would have to do so under the threat
of losing their license to prescribe other medicine. Because physicians
would have had little reason to challenge the policy outside a sense of
professional responsibility, the government policy ultimately harmed
patients the most, as patients would lose access to the unfiltered
medical advice of their chosen physicians. This disparity between the
relative benefits and burdens, Kozinski reasoned, must be considered
when courts assign and analyze First Amendment rights.76

71.

Id. at 639. The court pulled the phrase “narrow specificity” from
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).

72.

Conant, 309 F.3d at 639.

73.

Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).

74.

Id. at 639–40 (Kozinski, J., concurring).

75.

Id. at 640.

76.

Id.
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Eleven years after deciding Conant in favor of an expansive
reading of the First Amendment in the context of physician-patient
speech, the Ninth Circuit was put in a position of distinguishing its
own precedent. In Pickup v. Brown,77 the Ninth Circuit upheld Senate
Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”), a California law that prohibits state-licensed
mental health care providers from using “any practices by mental
health care providers . . . that seek to change [a juvenile’s] sexual
orientation.”78 The court offered the following explanation for its
holding: “[SB] 1172 regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment for
minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from discussing
the pros and cons of [sexual orientation change efforts] with their
patients.”79 Thus, while SB 1172 prohibited speech made in the course
of trying to change a juvenile’s sexual orientation, it did not ban
speech about the prohibited conduct.
To distinguish Conant, the court claimed that in that case the
federal policy at issue prohibited physicians from recommending that
patients use marijuana as treatment, as distinct from a law that
prohibits speech that is part and parcel of the treatment process. In
other words, the federal policy in Conant prohibited doctors from
talking about treatment, whereas SB 1172 prohibited the treatment
itself, including all spoken words that happened to be a part of the
treatment process.80 The court reasoned that the following three
principles governed its holding:
(1) [D]octor-patient communications about medical treatment
receive substantial First Amendment protection, but the government has more leeway to regulate the conduct necessary to administering treatment itself; (2) psychotherapists are not entitled to special First Amendment protection merely because the
mechanism used to deliver mental health treatment is the spoken word; and (3) nevertheless, communication that occurs during psychotherapy does receive some constitutional protection,
but it is not immune from regulation.81

77.

740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).

78.

Id. at 1222–24.

79.

Id. at 1229.

80.

Compare id. at 1226 (“[T]he demarcation between conduct and speech
in Conant was clear. The policy prohibited doctors from prescribing or
distributing marijuana, and neither we nor the parties disputed the
government’s authority to prohibit doctors from treating patients with
marijuana.”), with id. at 1229 (“Here, unlike in Conant . . . the law
allows discussions about treatment, recommendations to obtain
treatment, and expressions of opinions about SOCE and homosexuality.”).

81.

Id. at 1227.
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Using these three principles to categorize Conant and Pickup, the
court concluded that Conant fit under the first principle as involving
speech about treatment, while Pickup fit under the second principle
because SB 1172 prohibits only physician speech that is an inseparable part of sexual orientation change treatment.82
In the next section, I will explain the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the physician-patient speech doctrine to a dispute over a
Florida law that prohibits doctors from asking patients certain questions about gun ownership. Note that the court attempted to use the
Ninth Circuit decisions as precedent in reaching its conclusion.
B.

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida

In July 2010, Dr. Chris Okonkwo, a pediatrician in Ocala,
Florida, received a visit from Amber Ullman and her then fourmonth-old infant. In the course of a medical examination of the
infant, Dr. Okonkwo asked Ullman if she kept a gun in her house.
Ullman refused to answer the question. Dr. Okonkwo then told
Ullman that he had concerns about his ability to be her child’s
pediatrician and that she would need to find a new pediatrician if she
continued to refuse to answer his questions.83 Ullman still refused to
answer and even threatened to call a lawyer.84
In the aftermath of the “Ocala Incident,” Dr. Okonkwo claimed
that asking the parents of his patients questions about potential
safety hazards—such as swimming pools and cleaning products—was
his regular practice and that the practice was encouraged by the
American Association for Pediatrics and the American Medical Association.85 Ullman claimed that the question was invasive and unrelated
to the medical examination of her child.86
82.

Id. at 1229 (“Here, unlike in Conant . . . the law allows discussions
about treatment, recommendations to obtain treatment, and expressions
of opinions about SOCE and homosexuality.”).

83.

Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle over Gun Question,
Ocala.com (July 23, 2010), http://www.ocala.com/article/20100723/
news/100729867/1402/news?p=1&tc=pg. It bears noting that under the
American Medical Association Code of Ethics, the physician or the
patient is at liberty to terminate a relationship at any time. Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics of
the American Medical Association 342–43 (2012–2013 ed.).

84.

Hiers, supra note 83.

85.

Id. The American Medical Association does encourage physicians to ask
patients about the presence of firearms in the household and to provide
parents with information about safe storage of firearms. H-145.990
Prevention of Firearm Accidents in Children, Am. Med. Ass’n,
https://ssl3.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.
ama-assn.org&uri=%2fresources%2fhtml%2fPolicyFinder%2fpolicyfiles
%2fHnE%2fHnE%2fH-145.990.HTM (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).

86.

Hiers, supra note 83.
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Boosted by anecdotal evidence of a problem from the “Ocala
Incident” and the efforts of some powerful lobbying organizations,87
the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (“FOPA”) was enacted by the
Florida legislature and signed into law by then-Governor Rick Scott.88
Under FOPA, licensed health care practitioners may not do any of
the following: (1) keep records about a patient’s gun ownership if such
information is not relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety;
(2) ask a patient about gun ownership unless the physician believes
the question is relevant to the patient’s care or safety;
(3) discriminate against a patient because the patient owns a gun; or
(4) unnecessarily harass a patient about owning a gun.89 The
punishment for violating FOPA can be harsh; a practitioner who
violates FOPA can lose her license to practice.90
In Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,91 a group of medical practitioners
succeeded in permanently enjoining FOPA as an unconstitutional
restriction on speech. In defense of the law, the State of Florida
argued that the law was an ordinary regulation on the medical
profession. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida disagreed, holding that FOPA impermissibly burdened
speech.92 The court characterized FOPA as a content-based speech
restriction, rejecting Defendant’s argument that the law merely
imposed a regulation on the practice of medicine.93
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, concluding that FOPA
merely defines the limits of acceptable conduct for a physician during
the course of a medical examination.94 In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida, the Eleventh Circuit took a different perspective than the
district court, viewing the law as a reasonable measure to “protect[] a
patient’s ability to receive effective medical treatment without

87.

Emily Miller, “Docs v. Glocks” Showdown in Florida, Wash. Times,
Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/5/
docs-vs-glocks-showdown-in-florida/ (“The National Rifle Association
helped push the law through the Florida Legislature in 2011.”).

88.

Privacy of Firearm Owners, CS/CS/HB 155 (Fla. 2011), http://www.
myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44993&Session
Indes=-1&SessionId=66&BillText=&BillNumber=155&BillSponsor
Index=0&BillListIndex=0&BillStatuteText=&BillTypeIndex=0&BillRef
erredIndex=0&HouseChamber=H&BillSearchIndex=0 (last visited Sept.
26, 2014).

89.

Fla. Stat. § 790.338 (2014).

90.

Fla. Stat. § 790.338(8) (2014).

91.

880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012).

92.

Id. at 1270.

93.

Id. at 1261.

94.

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir 2014).
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compromising the patient’s privacy with regard to matters unrelated
to healthcare.”95
In defining FOPA as a regulation of the kind that does not need
to be subjected to strict scrutiny, the majority used a “personal
nexus” test.96 Reasoning that physicians’ First Amendment claims are
strongest when their speech is made in public on matters of public
concern and weakest when made in private on matters of private
concern, the court concluded that FOPA “regulates physician
speech . . . where the ‘personal nexus between professional and client’
is perhaps at its most significant; within the confines of the
physician’s examination room, where the physician exercises his or her
judgment to deliver professional treatment and advice to a particular
patient, tailored to that patient’s personal circumstances, in
private.”97
The court went on to cite Pickup v. Brown for the proposition
that regulations that define appropriate treatments are not subject to
First Amendment scrutiny. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that questions about gun ownership are not part of the
treatment process. In support of this position, the court pointed out
that medical treatment “may begin with an inquiry (‘do you
smoke?’), followed by a recommendation and . . . counseling (‘you
should quit because smoking has been shown to cause cancer’). . . .
[A] physician would almost certainly characterize an attempt to
convince a patient to cease smoking as . . . treatment.”98 Because
inquiries about gun ownership could be characterized as part of the
treatment process—and thus could be defined as part and parcel of
physicians’ conduct—the state was free to regulate the inquiries.
The next case involves a different kind of First Amendment
challenge than the last two cases. Whereas Conant and Wollschlaeger
both dealt with speech restrictions, the next case involves a First
Amendment challenge to an informed consent law that compels
physicians to deliver a state-mandated message before the treatment
stage.

95.

Id. at 1214.

96.

Id. at 1218 (“Thus, ‘[t]he key to distinguishing between occupational
regulation and abridgment of [F]irst [A]mendment liberties is in finding
a personal nexus between professional and client . . . . ’” (quoting
Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir.
1988))).

97.

Id. at 1219.

98.

Id.
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Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota v. Rounds

In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota
v. Rounds,99 Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin a provision in a
South Dakota informed consent law that requires physicians to
provide patients with a written statement before performing an
abortion.100 The provision at issue in the case—the “suicide provision”—ordered that the written statement describe “all known
medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors
to which the pregnant woman would be subjected,”101 including
“[i]ncreased risk of suicide and suicide ideation.”102 Planned Parenthood originally challenged the “suicide provision” as both an undue
burden on abortion rights and as a violation on “physicians’ First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.”103
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied
upon a standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey to uphold the informed consent law. According
to the court, Planned Parenthood failed to show that the “disclosure
at issue ‘is either untruthful, misleading, or not relevant to the
patient’s decision to have an abortion.’”104
Planned Parenthood argued that the compelled disclosure was
untruthful and misleading because it implied a “causal link between
abortion and suicide” that was not established by medical
authority.105 The court disagreed with Planned Parenthood’s
assessment of the statutory language, finding that “no language [in
the statute] refers to such a causal link.”106 The majority held that the
outcome of the case rested on the appropriate medical definition of
the phrase “increased risk.” Because the accepted meaning of the
phrase “increased risk” lacked “a requirement for conclusive proof of
causation,”107 the state did not need to establish conclusive proof of
causation between abortion and the increased risk of suicide and

99.

686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).

100. Id. at 893–94.
101. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(e) (2011).
102. § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii).
103. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892.
104. Id. at 893 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
653 F.3d 662, 735 (8th Cir. 2011)).
105. Id. at 894.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 895.
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suicide ideation in order to mandate the disclosure of the
“identification [of suicide and suicide ideation as] a medical risk.”108
The court also rejected Planned Parenthood’s contention that the
statute compelled the disclosure of an untruthful message because the
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide ideation “to which the
pregnant woman would be subjected” was not a “known medical risk
of the procedure.”109 Citing a “relevant rule of statutory construction,”
the court identified the phrase “to which a woman would be
subjected” as a “limiting clause” that should be interpreted as
modifying only the immediately preceding phrase, “statistically
significant risk factors,” and not the phrase before that, “all known
medical risks of the procedure.”110
Furthermore, because the “standard medical practice . . . is to
recognize a strongly correlated adverse outcome as a ‘risk’ while
further studies are conducted to clarify whether various underlying
factors play causal roles,”111 Planned Parenthood—not the state—was
required to present medical evidence establishing “to a degree of
scientifically accepted certainty”112 that abortion did not cause an
increase in the risk of suicide and suicide ideation. In support of its
position, Planned Parenthood presented the court with a ninety-onepage report from the American Psychological Association (“APA”)
reviewing the medical literature on the relationship between abortion
and the risk of suicide. The APA report found that “the best scientific
evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental health problems
among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy is no greater
if they have an elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver
that pregnancy.”113 Nevertheless, the majority found that the APA
report merely created medical uncertainty about the connection
between abortion and suicide. Because “the Supreme Court ‘has given
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in
areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty,’ including ‘in
the abortion context,’”114 the Rounds Court held that the South
Dakota law was sufficiently truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to
meet the standard laid out in Casey.115
108. Id.
109. Id. at 896.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 899.
112. Id. at 900.
113. Brenda Major et al., Report of the APA Task Force on
Mental Health and Abortion 90 (2008).
114. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 905–06 (quoting Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
163–64 (2007)).
115. Id. at 906.
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III. An Analysis of the
Physician-Patient Speech Doctrine
This Part analyzes common threads between the five cases
discussed in Part II, with the goal of establishing the existence of a
loosely connected doctrine. I will start by looking at the most obvious
similarities between the cases, such as the fact that all involve doctors
and patients and a state regulation. Then, I will move toward less
obvious similarities, including similarities that may only be true of
some of the cases. In the end, I identify what I believe are the two
most important similarities that exist among the cases: (1) that the
truly determinative factor in each case is the court’s characterization
of the purpose of the state regulation and whether that purpose fits
within traditional spheres of state regulation; and (2) that each court
fails to consider that patients, in addition to physicians, might have
First Amendment interests at stake—interests that are not subject to
state regulation.
Perhaps the most obvious commonality among the five cases is
that each involves a state regulation affecting the doctor physician
relationship. All of the cases, excepting Rounds and Casey, involved a
regulation that directly prohibited doctors from saying certain things
to their patients.116 I will identify these cases as the “Speech Restriction Cases.” In Rounds and Casey, the regulation compels doctors to
deliver a state mandated message, and so I will call these the “Speech
Compulsion Cases.”
All of the courts in the Speech Restriction Cases agreed that
states could regulate physician conduct, even if a regulation on conduct incidentally swept up some physician speech as a part of the
regulation.117 All three of the courts in the Speech Restriction Cases
agreed that physicians have a First Amendment right and that this
right provides varying levels of protection to physicians depending on
some combination of factors involving (1) the context in which the
speech is regulated (does it regulate conduct or speech, and is the
“personal nexus” between the physician and patient a close one?), (2)
the nature of the state regulation (is it a content-based, or viewpoint116. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal policy prohibiting physician recommendations of marijuana); Pickup v. Brown,
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (sexual orientation change efforts law);
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014)
(discussing the FOPA).
117. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639 (“Our decision is consistent with principles of
federalism that have left states as the primary regulators of professional
conduct.”); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (finding that the state’s power to
regulate professional speech is greatest where the regulation is directed
at professional conduct); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1218 (noting the
states’ “long-established authority” to regulate physician conduct).
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based, speech restriction?), and (3) the purpose of the regulation
(does it do similar things as other state regulations on the practice of
medicine, like protect privacy interests?).
Breaking down these factors, each court agreed that content- and
viewpoint-based restrictions should receive strict scrutiny.118 There
was, however, disagreement between the district court and appellate
court in Wollschlaeger regarding whether or not the FOPA was a
content-based speech restriction. And while the Eleventh Circuit in
Wollschlaeger was the only court to emphasize the fact that the law
at issue only affected physician speech that occurs in the “private
confines of the examination room,”119 all of the courts in the Speech
Restriction Cases at least mentioned that speech by a physician in
public on a matter of public concern would receive full First
Amendment protection.120 Lastly, and most significantly, all of the
cases noted the importance of the state’s purpose for having the
regulation.121
In fact, a close examination of each case, including the Speech
Compulsion Cases, will show that the court’s characterization of the
purpose of the regulation at issue proved to be determinative in the
outcome of the case.
For example, in Conant, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
only legitimate purpose the federal government could have for
prohibiting physicians from recommending marijuana to patients was
to prevent physicians from helping patients obtain marijuana, a
purpose that was already covered by existing criminal laws that
prohibited “aiding and abetting” the possession of a controlled substance.122 Since controlled substances were already covered by rules
118. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (“[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech are
‘presumptively invalid.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992))); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (“[C]ontent- or viewpointbased regulation[s] . . . must be closely scrutinized.”); Wollschlaeger, 760
F.3d at 1239 (“Content-based statutes . . . are presumptively invalid.”
(quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382)).
119. Compare Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1219 (finding that the need for
state regulation of physician conduct is at its highest in “the
examination room”), with Conant, 309 F.3d 629 (no discussion of the
physical location of the regulated conduct), and Pickup, 740 F. 3d 1208
(no discussion of physical location).
120. See supra note 118.
121. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (to control drug trafficking); Pickup, 740 F.3d
at 1223 (to protect juveniles); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d 1195 (to protect
patients’ privacy); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2012) (to ensure patients give informed
consent to abortion procedure); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (to protect informed consent).
122. Conant, 309 F.3d at 635–36 (“A doctor’s anticipation of patient conduct, however, does not translate into aiding and abetting, or conspir-
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outside those directly concerning state regulation of professional conduct, and because recommendations were not equivalent to prescriptions in this regard, the Conant Court found that the purpose behind
the federal policy could not justify its infringement on physician
speech.
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Wollschlaeger that
the purpose of FOPA was to protect patients’ privacy on matters
deemed irrelevant to medical care.123 The court conceded that professional rules already protect patients’ privacy in a general way but
ultimately reasoned that that fact alone would not prevent the state
from providing an extra safeguard by defining specific boundaries in
regards to the kind of information doctors can ask for and keep.124 The
court even dismissed the idea that the conduct versus speech
distinction could determine the outcome in the case, because “the line
between treatment and communication about treatment is not
necessarily . . . clear.” Thus, the purpose of protecting the privacy
interests of patients, more than the application of a fungible conductversus-speech test, proved to be the difference between strict constitutional scrutiny and none at all.
Even in Rounds, the court framed the issue around the purpose of
the statute in regards to regulating the medical profession. The court
concluded that the informed consent law passed constitutional scrutiny not only because it found the law to be truthful and not misleading, but also because the law provided very specific directions to
physicians concerning an area of medicine that has been subject to
state regulation for a long time: the process of obtaining informed
consent from patients before performing a certain course of treatment
or procedure.125
Even though the courts do not directly state it as the constitutional standard for physician-patient speech cases, it is the purpose of
the state regulation, as determined by the courts, that proves to be
the most critical and determinative factor in physician-patient speech
cases. If a court finds that a regulation serves the same interests as
acy. A doctor would aid and abet by acting with the specific intent to
provide a patient with the means to acquire marijuana.”).
123. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (“The Act seeks to protect patients’
privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians regarding firearms.”).
124. Id. at 1215 (“The Act merely reaffirms the boundaries surrounding what
constitutes good medical practice by codifying into law this commonsense proposition, and serves the important purpose of protecting the
privacy rights of patients who do not wish to answer questions about
irrelevant and private matters.”).
125. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 893 (emphasizing that the South Dakota law at
issue only compels physician speech as part of the process of obtaining
informed consent from patients).
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traditional state regulations, such as regulations that protect privacy
or, as in Pickup, the unique interests of juveniles, then the court will
almost certainly uphold the restriction (as long as it is not a contentor viewpoint-based restriction). On the other hand, if a court cannot
find a basis in a traditional area of state regulation of physician
speech, then it is more likely to subject the regulation to strict
scrutiny.
There is one last similarity between the cases discussed in Part II.
All of the courts in those cases, with the possible exception of Conant,
treated the physician as the “active player” in the case, meaning the
person whose First Amendment rights were either violated by the
regulation or not. This makes sense on the surface, as all of the
regulations at issue are directed at physicians; in each case, it is the
physician who is given a choice to either follow the regulation or face
reprimand. But that fact alone does not mean that the physician is
the only one whose First Amendment rights are implicated.
As discussed in Part IV below, the First Amendment includes the
right to receive information. Because patients go to doctors to obtain
information, patients have a First Amendment interest in state regulations that affect physician speech. This First Amendment interest in
receiving information is almost entirely lost in the physician-patient
speech jurisprudence. Moreover, because patients are not licensed by
the state, and thus are not subject to special state regulations that
may infringe on First Amendment interests, the lower courts are
failing to do a large part of the appropriate analysis.

IV. Toward a Patient-Centered Understanding
of the First Amendment
The majority opinions in Conant, Pickup, Wollschlaeger, and
Rounds (and even the Casey plurality) each analyzed the First
Amendment issues from the standpoint of physicians’ free speech
rights.126 It is my position that in contrast to this physician-centered
approach to free speech, it was the rights of patients as receivers of
medical information that were actually at stake in those cases. By
failing to fully consider patients’ First Amendment rights, the courts
in all of these cases left out the central constitutional issue: whether
the law or order in question infringed on patients’ rights to receive
frank and free-flowing medical advice from their physicians. In order
to make the case for this patient-based theory of free speech, I will
first argue that such an approach to the First Amendment is rooted
in precedent.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment protects the right to receive information to the same
126. See supra Part II.
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degree as the right to speak it.127 The Court has applied this interpretation of free speech in a vast range of factual scenarios, from the
right of a wife to receive mail from her incarcerated husband128 to the
right of consumers to receive the prices of prescription drugs from
advertisers.129 The right to receive information under the First Amendment commonly comes up in the context of commercial speech. In
those cases, the Court has reasoned that the First Amendment serves
to protect the “informational function of advertising.”130 Exploring the
right to receive information from the standpoint of the marketplace
theory of the First Amendment, Justice Brennan observed that “[i]t
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers.”131
In Wollschlaeger, the court held that “there is no ‘constitutional
infirmity’ where the speech rights of physicians are ‘implicated, but
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.’”132 The court did not consider
applying a patient-based theory of the First Amendment, which
would have recognized the right of patients to receive the full range of
information that a physician could give about the potential health
risks that are inherent to gun ownership.133 Likewise, in Rounds, the
court framed its holding from the standpoint of physicians: “the
suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights
nor a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”134 In so doing, the
court ignored that the suicide advisory effectively prevented patients
127. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965)
(recognizing a First Amendment right to receive political publications
via the U.S. Postal Service sent from foreign countries); Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows
ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.”).
128. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
129. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“First
Amendment protection [of] commercial speech is justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides . . . .”).
131. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834
(1992)).
133. Id.
134. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906
(8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
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from receiving additional relevant information on the subject from
their physicians. Even the Conant majority, while acknowledging the
“core First Amendment interests of doctors and patients”135 and the
“‘imperative need for confidence and trust’ inherent in the doctorpatient relationship,”136 failed to adequately explain the rationale for
protecting the communication from the patient’s side of the relationship.137
Only Judge Kozinski’s concurring opinion in Conant gives
adequate attention to the distinction between protecting the First
Amendment rights of patients to receive information and the First
Amendment rights of physicians to give it. The issue with framing the
competing arguments from the standpoint of the physician’s free
speech rights is that “the harm to patients from being denied the
right to receive candid medical advice is far greater than the harm to
doctors from being unable to deliver such advice.”138 Physicians adjust
to laws curtailing their free speech rights and have little incentive,
outside a sense of professional obligation, to provide patients with the
best medical advice or to challenge speech restrictions or compulsions.
Physicians have much to lose from defying laws, however, as some
speech restrictions—such as the government policy in Conant and the
speech restriction in Wollschlaeger—carry stiff professional consequences, sometimes as harsh as revoking their license to prescribe
controlled substances139 or even suspending or revoking their license to
practice.140
In contrast to the stake that the physicians had in the outcomes
of the cases examined in this Note, patients had relatively little to
gain from the speech restrictions and much to lose from being denied
accurate and current information. While modern technology allows
patients the freedom to research their medical inquiries on their own
and decide for themselves about the relative efficacy and morality of
medical procedures and treatments, “word-of-mouth and the Internet
are poor substitutes for a medical doctor; information obtained from

135. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
136. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
137. See id. at 629–39 (discussing, in the majority opinion, only the physician’s First Amendment rights).
138. Id. at 643 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
139. The government order at issue in Conant carried with it the potential
repercussion of the government stripping the physician’s license to prescribe medication. Id. at 632 (majority opinion).
140. The Florida law at issue in Wollschlaeger carried the threat of the state
revoking the license to practice of any physician who failed to comply.
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1204–05 (11th Cir.
2014).
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chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss of individualized
advice from a physician.”141

Conclusion
The physician-patient speech doctrine is a dynamic area of First
Amendment law that—if the last twelve years are an accurate
indicator—is certain to evolve in the coming decade. It is critical to
approach speech restrictions and compulsions that affect the
physician-patient relationship as “strik[ing] at core First Amendment
interests of doctors and patients.”142 Open and honest communication
between physicians and patients is “an integral component of the
practice of medicine,”143 and, especially in certain contexts, is worthy
of “the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer.”144
Speech compulsions that order physicians to disclose information
that conflicts with the weight of medical authority have the potential
to chill physician speech and thus fail to reflect “the imperative need
for confidence and trust”145 between doctors and patients. Insofar as
the truthful-non-misleading-and-relevant standard articulated in
Casey allows government entities to compel physician speech that
lacks an established basis in research accepted by the mainstream
medical community, that standard inadequately protects patients’
rights to receive any and all uncensored medical advice that their
physicians are able and willing to give them.
Ultimately, because physicians are usually the ones who are
actively threatened with punishment for disobeying speech compulsions and restrictions—and because the stakes are highest for patients
in the debate about the applicability of the First Amendment to laws
regulating physician-patient communications—it is critical to view the
First Amendment as protecting patients’ rights to receive frank and
open medical advice from their physicians. Whatever standard of
review courts choose to apply to constitutional disputes over
physician-patient speech restrictions must take adequate account of
patients’ First Amendment rights to receive free-flowing, honest communication from their physicians, or else we will continue the current
trend of inconsistency in the outcomes of cases. Moreover, a patientbased standard of review would bring cases like Wollschlaeger,
Rounds, Pickup, and Conant into line with the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence in other contexts. Such a standard would
141. Conant, 309 F.3d at 644 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 636 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995).
145. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
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appropriately have a greater likelihood of chilling the laws and
policies that strain open communication between physicians and
patients, instead of allowing for laws that chill that communication.
As the Supreme Court has put it, “[i]f the First Amendment means
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—
resort.”146
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146. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
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